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Abstract
What are the determinants of philanthropic and political giving? Are donations to chari-
ties and parties driven by the same incentives? In this article, we use new administrative
household panel data to quantify empirically the motivations for giving, depending on
donors’ characteristics and tax incentives. Our dataset includes all the households filling
their income tax and/or their wealth tax returns in France between 2006 and 2019. In
France, both charitable and political donations benefit from income tax deductions, but
only the charitable ones are eligible to the wealth tax credit. We exploit the 2018 wealth
tax reform – a change in the taxable base that led to a drop by two third in the number of
liable households – to estimate the cross-price elasticity of charitable and political giving
at different levels of the income and wealth distributions. We provide new evidence of
substituability between charitable and political donations: according to our estimates, a
one-percent increase in the price of charitable giving leads to a 19 to 25% increase in
political donations. The magnitude of this effect is particularly strong among the the top
20% of the wealth taxpayers.
Keywords: charitable giving, political donations, tax incentives for giving, tax deduc-
tions, wealth tax credit, cross-elasticity of donations
JEL No: H24, H31, L38
∗We are grateful for the valuable comments from Gabrielle Fack, Elise Huillery and Lukas Schmid. We also
thank seminar participants at the University of Lucerne and at the University Paris Dauphine – PSL. Romane
Surel provided outstanding research assistance. The research leading to this project has received funding from
the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(Grant Agreement no. 948516). It is also supported by a public grant overseen by the French National
Research Agency (ANR) as part of the “Investissements d’avenir” program (reference: ANR-10-EQPX-17
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1 Introduction
There has been a rise in charitable giving in Western democracies in recent years. In the United
States, according to the statistics provided by Giving USA1 charitable giving has increased
by 121% between 2000 and 2019 – from 203 billions dollars to 450 billions; in Switzerland,
we similarly observe a 78.3% increase between 2003 and 2019 and in France, a 78.6% increase
between 2006 and 2019, from 1.465 to 2.617 billion euros.2 How to explain such an increase?
First, tax policies in many Western democracies increasingly offer substantial incentives to
donate to charities. This increase has also been related to individuals’ growing desire to be
seen to be doing good (e.g. the so-called warm-glow motive for giving described by Andreoni,
1989, 1990). Yet, philanthropy may not be just about giving, and can also serve political
objectives (see e.g. Reich, 2018; Bertrand et al., 2020a). In many countries, such as the U.S.,
we observe a concomitant increase in political donations. This raises the question of how
these two types of givings intertwine.
In this article, we study the determinants of both charitable and political giving. While
there is an extensive literature estimating the tax-price elasticity of giving and the impact of
tax incentives to donate to charity (Bakija and Heim, 2011; Fack and Landais, 2016b; Almunia
et al., 2020), little is known on the political motivations underlying contributions to charitable
activities. To investigate whether donations to charities and political parties are driven by
the same incentives, we use new administrative household panel data. Our dataset includes
all the households filling their income tax and/or their wealth tax returns in France between
2006 and 2019, i.e. around 39 million households per year that we can follow over time and
across wealth and income tax returns thanks to a unique household identifier.
In France, charitable and political donations of households can benefit from tax deductions
that are relatively generous in international comparisons. On the one hand, charitable and
political giving can benefit from a nonrefundable income tax credit equal to 66% of the gift.3
On the other hand, charitable donations (but not the political ones) can benefit from a wealth-
tax reduction equal to 75% of the amount of the donations made (up to a limit of e50, 000
per year4). Taxpayers liable to the wealth tax can choose to declare their charitable donations
either to the wealth tax or to the income tax (but they cannot declare it twice). Further,
while donations to parties and electoral campaigns are capped, charitable donations are not
but can nonetheless benefit politically-involved nonprofit organizations, think tanks to begin
1https://givingusa.org/
2According to the authors’ own calculations. See Section 3 below for detailed information about the data
sources.
3The gift can be deducted up to a ceiling currently equal to 20% of taxable income. See Section 2 below
for more details.
4However, households are offered the possibility to fiscally report excess donations from one year to the
other.
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with (Cagé, 2018).5 France thus provides a unique empirical framework to investigate whether
donations to charities and to parties are substitutes or complements.
Estimating the cross-elasticity of political and charitable donations raises a number of
empirical challenges, reverse causality to begin with. What’s more, omitted variables such as
the intrinsic generosity or the political ideology of the donors can also bias naive estimates. In
this article, we overcome these challenges by proposing a new instrumental strategy exploiting
a tax reform. In 2018, the solidarity tax on wealth6 became a real-estate tax7. This reform did
not modify the tax schedule but restricted the definition of the tax base to real-estate assets,
excluding other investments (in particular financial assets) which were previously included.
With this transformation of the wealth tax into a tax on housing assets, two thirds of the
households liable to the wealth tax on their 2016 wealth are not liable for their 2017 wealth
anymore, and thus can no longer benefit from the 75% wealth-tax deductions for charitable
giving.8 In other words, the reform created a shock on the price of charitable giving – that
increases from 25 to 34% of the amount of the gift given the income tax credit is “only” equal
to 66% of the donations9 – but not on the price of political donations, given political giving
was not eligible to the wealth-tax deduction before the reform.
In practice, we proceed as follows: we use the 2018 wealth tax reform as an instrument
for the price of charitable giving in the first stage of the estimation10, and then investigate
in the second stage how the (instrumented) price of charitable giving affects political giving.
“Treated” households are those households who were liable to the wealth tax in 2016 but
not in 2017 and beyond because of the tax reform, while the “control” group is made of the
households liable to the new wealth tax and who can thus still benefit from the 75% wealth-tax
deduction following the reform. Our identification assumption is that, given political giving
was not eligible to wealth tax deductions and thus not directly affected by the reform, the
2018 wealth-tax reform only affected political donations through its effect on the tax price of
charitable giving.
The main threat to our empirical strategy comes from the fact that the wealth-tax reform
led to a decrease in the amount of taxes paid for the households in the treated and the control
group11, i.e. an increase in the resources at their disposal (a phenomena that we can approach
5Even charitable donations to non politically-involved foundations can be driven by political motives, e.g.
buying access and time. We will come back to this point later.
6ISF or “impôt de solidarité sur la fortune” in French.
7IFI or “impôt sur la fortune immobilière”.
8In France, a wealth tax for year t is levied on the wealth evaluated at the end of year t − 1, so that the
2018 reform is effective from the 2017 wealth on.
9Compared to 75% for the wealth-tax credit.
10The price of charitable giving corresponds to the cost of giving an additional euro: 25% if the household
is liable to the wealth tax, 34% if the ceiling of the wealth tax deduction is reached, 0 if the income tax cap is
reached (see Section 3.3 for detailed explanations). As a result of the low variation in the price, its correlation
with the instrument is very high, which ensures that the estimation is not threatened by a weak instrument
issue.
11We observe a decrease of e10, 820 and e7, 702 for households in the control and treated group, respectively.
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just like a positive “income effect”). This positive shock might have had a direct effect on
either or both political and charitable donations through a resource effect (with more cash at
their disposal, households decide to contribute more12).
First, we compute for the households in both the treated and the control group the amount
of taxes saved thanks to the reform, and show that controlling for this amount only slightly
decreases the estimated price elasticity of political giving. Then, we turn to a more conserva-
tive approach where we only consider in our instrumental variable analysis treated and control
households who face approximately the same tax saving. While doing so reduces the size of
our sample, it does not affect our main findings qualitatively.
Overall, we show that a one-percent increase in the price of charitable giving leads to a
25.4% increase in political donations. In other words, consistently with findings by Petrova
et al. (2020) who deduce substituability from the fact that households react differently to
natural disasters and to political ads in their giving behavior, we show that charitable and
political giving as substitutes.13 The estimated elasticity is equal to 19% when we reduce our
sample of analysis to the households who face a similar tax saving. Our findings are robust
to a number of different empirical specifications and robustness checks.
The magnitude of the effects is heterogeneous depending on the wealth of the house-
holds (considered before the reform) as well as on their income. In particular, our estimates
are nearly three times larger among the top 20% wealth tax payers compared to the other
households, and this difference is statistically significant.
Our results have important policy implications. If donations to charities are (at least)
partly driven by political considerations, then one might question the relevance of having
different tax deductions for charitable and political giving. Next, given political donations
are capped in France (as well as in a number of other countries) to assure political equity,
it may also be relevant to limit (politically-driven) charitable contributions. We discuss the
welfare implications of our results at the end of the paper.
Literature review Our paper first contributes to the long tradition of research analyzing
philanthropic giving, and in particular estimating the tax-price elasticity of giving (Feldstein
and Taylor, 1976; Randolph, 1995; Bakija and Heim, 2011; Andreoni and Payne, 2013).14
12See for example Bakija and Heim (2011) who show that the elasticity of charity with respect to a persistent
income change is equal to 0.51.
13This finding contradicts Yörük (2015) however. While Yörük (2015) relies on cross-sectional household
surveys of donations in the U.S. between 1990 and 2001, we use panel data that allow us to follow households
over time. We can thus exploit a shock on the price of charitable giving to causally identify how households
adjust their political donations, using within-household variations. Interestingly, when we simply consider
the raw relationship between the price of charitable giving and political donations, without household-level
controls, we find no statistically significant correlation. Instrumenting for the price of giving allows us to
uncover the fact that political and charitable donations are substitute. Yörük (2015) uses the tax price of
giving as an instrument for charitable donations, but does not instrument for this price.
14See also Bakija (2013) and Fack and Landais (2016a) for a literature review on tax policy and philanthropy.
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Several articles in this literature have estimated the effect of tax incentives for charitable
contributions. Fack and Landais (2010) use two reforms in France that increased the non-
refundable tax credit rate in 2003 and 2005, and Fack and Landais (2016b) exploit the 1983
tightening of the requirements to claim charitable deductions.15 Fack and Landais (2010) find
that the elasticity price of gifts is around −0.2 to −0.6 depending on income; in the U.S.
context, Bakija and Heim (2011) estimate an elasticity in excess of −1.
Compared to this literature, our contribution is fourfold. First, while the focus of these
papers is on charitable contributions, we also consider political donations that benefit from
similar tax incentives but may be driven by different motivations. Campaign contributions
and charitable giving are indeed most often not analyzed in conjunction, while they may be
considered as the two sides of the same coin.16 An exception is Petrova et al. (2020) who
provide evidence that individuals substitute between political contributions and charitable
contributions using data from the US and shocks on charitable and political giving (see also
Yörük (2015) who uses survey data to investigate the spillover effects of charitable subsidies
on political giving in the US between 1990 and 2001 and finds complementarity between the
two kinds of donations).17 We contribute to this literature by looking at substitution effects
within the same donors. Our data indeed allow us to investigate at the taxpayer level the
propensity of individuals to contribute to both political parties and charities and, thanks to
our empirical strategy, we can isolate the causal effect of an increase in the price of charitable
giving (driven by a change in tax incentives) on political donations (not affected directly by
this change).18
Second, while the focus of the existing literature has been on the income tax, our paper
15See also Doerrenberg et al. (2017) who exploit several tax reforms implemented in Germany between 2001
and 2008 to estimate both the elasticity of taxable income and the elasticity of deductions with respect to
net-of-tax rate. In the French context, Guillot (2019) and Aghion et al. (2019) study behavioral responses to
changes in taxation.
16Ansolabehere et al. (2003) argue, for example, that both political and charitable giving should be regarded
as a form of consumption. There is a growing literature that examines the non-tax determinants of donations,
whose primary focus is on changes in societal needs: Deryugina and Marx (2020), using deadly tornadoes, find
that giving to one cause needs not come at the expense of another; Fong and Luttmer (2009) investigate the
role of racial group loyalty in the context of donations to hurricane Katrina victims (on giving to disasters, see
also Scharf et al., 2017). Next, DellaVigna et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (2017) investigate the importance
of the social context, and in particular of social pressure in charitable giving.
17Hungerman et al. (2018) investigate the effect of campaign activity on non-political donations, and doc-
ument an increase in collections for nearby churches the week following a campaign stop by a presidential
candidate.
18There is a large literature on the determinants of campaign contributions (for a literature review, see
Dawood, 2015), but this literature mostly overlooks the issue of the tax price of political giving. This is mostly
due to the fact that political donations in the US do not give rise to tax deductions – while it is the case in
France (as well as in many others Western democracies), and so can be studied in our context. The main
determinants of campaign donations that have been highlighted in the literature are political influence (see
Gordon et al. (2007); Chamon and Kaplan (2013); Barber (2016) for empirical evidence, and Grossman and
Helpman (1994, 1996) for the leading theoretical models); the willingness to affect election outcomes (Poole
and Romer, 1985; Wand, 2007); a consumption motive (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Gimpel et al., 2008); and
the effect of political advertising (see e.g. Green et al., 2015, on the impact of non partisan messages).
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also exploits variations in the wealth tax and estimates cross-price elasticity of giving. While
there exists a very large literature investigating the impact of wealth taxation (Brülhart et al.,
2016; Seim, 2017; Jakobsen et al., 2019), to the extent of our knowledge, we are the very first
to study the extent to which wealth-tax deductions impact donations. Furthermore, while the
existing research mostly considers direct variations in the price of giving (through changes in
the tax treatment donations benefit from), we consider indirect shocks (exploiting a wealth
tax reform).
Third, while the existing research mostly uses survey data19, sample of tax payers20 or
focuses on the top of the income distribution when using tax returns, we rely on an exhaustive
administrative panel dataset and estimate the elasticities at different levels of the distribu-
tion.21 Almunia et al. (2020) similarly use administrative tax return data (from the UK) and
exploit a tax reform. But while they only consider the income tax and focus on charitable
giving, we study both income and wealth tax in this paper, and investigate whether there are
substitution effects between charitable and political donations.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing literature on the political economy of
charitable giving. In the US context, Bertrand et al. (2020a) analyze the role of charitable
giving as a means of political influence. They estimate that 16.1 percent of total US corporate
charitable giving can be interpreted as politically motivated (see also Bertrand et al., 2018). 22
Compared to this work, we contribute to the literature by estimating whether charitable giving
and political donations act as substitutes or complements. This is of particular importance
in contexts where political donations are limited, but not charitable contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 below, we provide histori-
cal background on tax deductions for charitable and political contributions in France, and
describe the tax reforms that took place during our period of interest. Section 3 presents
the unique panel data we use in this article, provides descriptive statistics and describe our
identification strategy. Section 4 presents the main results, their robustness, and investigate
the heterogeneity of the effect across various dimensions. In Section 5 we discuss our findings
and their policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
19Among others, Brown and Lankford (1992); Scharf and Smith (2015); Yörük (2015); Backus and Grant
(2016).
20E.g. Fack and Landais (2010) use a repeated cross-section of 500,000 tax payers drawn every year by the
tax administration; Bakija and Heim (2008) relies on a panel of 550,000 disproportionately high-income ax
returns.
21A strand of the literature also relies on charities’ tax filings. See in particular Duquette (2016).
22For a review of the most recent empirical literature on lobbying in political economy, see Bombardini and
Trebbi (2020). See also Fioretti (2020).
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2 Historical background
In this section, we first describe the French regulatory background for charitable and political
contributions. We then outline the main tax reforms that took place during our period of
interest (2006-2019). The time period considered is determined by data availability reasons:
the wealth tax return data at the households level are only available between 2006 and 2019.
2.1 Tax deductions for charitable and political contributions
Tax incentives for charitable giving were introduced relatively late in France in international
comparison, but with much higher rebates (Fack and Landais, 2016a; Fack et al., 2018). To
understand these rebates and their evolution over time, one first needs to distinguish between
different kinds of donations: (i) charitable giving, (ii) donations to charities fighting against
poverty (the so-called “dons Coluche”), and (iii) political donations.
2.1.1 Income tax credit
Tax credit for charitable giving A tax incentive toward charitable giving has existed in
France since 1954, but has been significantly modified over time (Fack and Landais, 2010).
The initial deduction mechanism, which worked as a deduction from taxable income, was
replaced in 1989 by a nonrefundable tax credit of 40 percent. With a nonrefundable tax
credit, all taxpayers benefit from the same tax credit rate equal to x% of the gift, regardless
of their income level. However, the gift can only be deducted up to a ceiling currently equal
to 20% of the taxable income.23 Further, given the tax credit is nonrefundable, the deduction
cannot exceed the income tax that is due for taxable households.
The tax credit rate was raised three times since the late 1980s: from 40 to 50 percent in
1996, from 50 to 60 percent in 2003, and from 60 to 66 percent in 200524, a rate that has been
unchanged since then.
Tax credit for Coluche giving In 1989, a specific rate was created for the donations
to charities that help people in need – and that we will call “Coluche giving” from now.25
These donations – that have to be below a certain threshold (e546 in 2019) – benefit from a
nonrefundable income tax credit of 75% percent.26
23However, if the gift exceeds the ceiling, its reporting can be spread out over five years. We will come back
to this point later.
24Fack and Landais (2010) exploit the 2003 and 2005 reforms.
25Coluche is a French stage comedian and cinema actor who launched in 1985 the charity “Les Restaurants
du Coeur”. This nonprofit organization provides free meals and other products to people in need.
26This rate was equal to 50% at the time of its creation; it then increased from 50 to 60% in 2003 and from
60 to 75% in 2005.
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Tax credit for political giving Political donations, i.e. donations to political parties and
to campaigns, are allowed in France since 1988 (Cagé, 2018; Bekkouche et al., 2020). Tax
deductions for these donations were introduced at the exact same time, with the same rate
than for other charitable donations (i.e. a 66% nonrefundable income tax credit). However,
contrary to charitable donations, political donations are limited by law in France. A natural
person may contribute up to e4, 600 to each campaign, and donate an annual maximum of
e7, 500 to political parties or groups.27
We observe donations to political parties directly in the income tax returns data since 2013
(they were previously bundled with charitable donations28). We report descriptive statistics
on these donations in Section 3.2 below. One can also study the aggregate change in political
donations by using the accounts of the political parties that have to report annually the
donations they receive. Online Appendix Figure C.5 plots this number. Consistently with
what we observe in Figure C.4 using the fiscal data, we observe a decrease in this number in
recent years.
Note that taxpayers report their charitable, Coluche and political giving on the same page
of their income tax form, but on three different rows (“7UD”, “7UF” and “7UH”; see online
Appendix Figure C.1 for an illustration).
2.1.2 Wealth tax credit
The wealth tax credit for charitable donations – political donations are not eligible to this tax
credit – was introduced in 2007 as part of the “loi TEPA”, a fiscal package aiming at light-
ening the fiscal burden on businesses, liberalize the labor market and stimulate investment.
Interestingly, section 6 of this Law – introducing the wealth-tax deductions – went relatively
unnoticed at the time, with virtually no media coverage.29 The wealth tax credit was very
generous, though, with a wealth-tax reduction equal to 75% of the amount of the donations
made, up to a limit of e50, 000 per year.30
27Corporations are not allowed to contribute to political parties or campaigns since 1995 (Bekkouche et al.,
2020). Until 2012, individuals were allowed to give annually e7, 500 to each of the political parties of their
choice. The rule was changed in 2012 – e7, 500 overall, taking into account the donations made to all the
political parties – because parties were increasingly creating micro-parties to augment the donations they
could receive.
28Donations to electoral campaigns are still bundled with charitable donations in the tax data as of today. We
provide below descriptive statistics on these donations that we compute from the electoral campaign records.
29We have gone through all the articles published by the five main daily newspapers (Le Monde, L’Humanité,
La Croix, Le Figaro, and Libération) at the time about the law, and found nearly no mention of section 6. All
the media attention was focused on Articles 1 to 4 of the law that introduced a tax exemption for overtime,
a reform of the inheritance tax, a change of the tax shield, and an experimentation of the “active solidarity
revenue” (RSA).
30There were also very few discussions at the time in the Parliament about this specific section of the law –
to the exception of some debate about whether political donations should also benefit from it. In particular,
no specific estimation was made of the cost of the reform The only estimation provided was the joint estimated
cost of this reduction together with other measures in favors of the SMBs (overall, the estimated cost was equal
to e410 million per year).
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Note that taxpayers liable to the wealth tax can choose to declare their charitable dona-
tions either to the wealth tax or to the income tax, but they cannot declare it twice. However,
contrary to the income tax credit, not all nonprofit organizations are eligible to the wealth tax
credit. Indeed, only a subset of the nonprofit organizations that are recognized as “being of
public utility” (the so-called “Fondations Reconnues d’Utilité Publique” or FRUP) can benefit
from it, as well as the non-profit research, higher education or artistic institutions of general
interest.
As of today, there exist 661 FRUPs. While this number might seem small, in particular
compared to the 1.3 million associations that exist in France, it turns out not to be. Indeed,
while the majority of the associations are very small structures, with nearly no funding and
most often no employees, the FRUPs tend to be much larger and represent from this point
of view a more important part of the non-for-profit sector in France. Two thirds of the
associations have annual budgets of less than e7, 500, and only 5% of the associations have
an annual budget of more than e150, 000.31 On the contrary, to become a FRUP, a foundation
needs to have an endowment of at least e1.5 million.32 We will come back to this point in
Section 5.2 below, where we discuss the political dimension of a number of foundations.
2.2 The 2018 wealth tax reform
The goal of this paper is to estimate the cross-elasticity of political and charitable donations.
However, doing so raises a number of empirical challenges given reverse causality and omitted
variable bias. To obtain a causal estimate, we propose in this article to exploit the 2018
wealth tax reform.33 We present our empirical strategy in Section 3 below; here, we simply
describe the reform.
In 2018, the solidarity tax on wealth became a real-estate tax. While the tax schedule
was unchanged34, the taxable base was: compared to the previous solidarity tax on wealth,
the real-estate tax only covers real-estate assets and excludes other investments (in particular
financial assets). Because of the reform, two thirds of the households who were liable to the
wealth tax in 2016 are not liable in 2017 anymore, i.e. 238, 564 out of 356, 227 households.
Hence, this wealth tax reform led to a drop in the number of households liable to the
wealth tax, and so to the number of households eligible to the wealth-tax deduction. For the
31According to the Ministry of the interior: https://www.associations.gouv.fr/
les-associations-en-france.html#Les-chiffres. 92% of the associations have annual budgets of
less than e75, 000.
32Law n87-571 of July 23, 1987 on the development of patronage.
33A number of other tax reforms took place during our period of interest, that we do not use in this article
but describe in the online Appendix Section B.
34Are liable to the wealth tax, only the households whose net taxable wealth is above e1.3 million. The
tax rates is equal to (i) 0% between e0 and e800, 000, (ii) 0.5% between e800, 000 and e1, 300, 000, (iii)
0.7% between e1, 300, 000 and e2, 570, 000, (iv) 1% between e2, 570, 000 and e5, 000, 000, (v) 1.25% between
e5, 000, 000 and e10, 000, 000, and (vi) 1.5% above e10, 000, 000.
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households no longer liable to the wealth tax following the reform, it also implied an increase
in the price of charitable giving – given they could no longer benefit from the 75% wealth-tax
credit – but no changes for political donations, which have never been eligible to this credit.
3 Data, descriptive analysis and identification strategy
The data are from the General Directorate of Public Finance, and is made available through
the CASD (“Centre d’accès sécurisé aux données”). We briefly describe the dataset here and
provide more details on data construction in the online Appendix Section A.
3.1 Panel dataset
Our dataset includes all the households who must declare their taxes in France, i.e. all the
households filling their income tax and/or their wealth returns. In France, an individual must
file an annual tax return if she is in one of the following situations: (i) she resides in France, (ii)
her main professional activity is in France, (iii) she turned 18 in year N and she is no longer
attached to her parents’ tax household, (iv) she lives abroad but her income is from a French
source. The tax return is mandatory regardless of the amount of her income, even if it is zero
or low.35 Overall, around 38.5 million households file an income tax return as of 2018. There
is a single tax return per tax household, unless there is a change of the household definition
during the year (e.g. because of a marriage or a divorce). For single persons (single, divorced,
widowed, cohabiting) the tax household is made up of the taxpayer and her dependents. For
married and civil union partners, the tax household consists of the taxpayer, his/her spouse
and dependents. The income and expenses of all members of the tax household are taken
into account to establish a single tax assessment (in the empirical analysis below, we always
control for the number of fiscal shares).
Regarding the wealth tax, since 201836, are required to file a declaration the individuals
whose real estate assets have a net taxable value strictly superior to the tax threshold, i.e.
e1, 300, 000. An individual domiciled outside of France for tax purposes (and so not filling
an income tax return) has to file a wealth-tax declaration if her real estate assets and rights
located in France37 are above e1, 300, 00038. In the online Appendix Figure C.2, we report
35Note that in 2019, a reform introduces the “prélèvement à la source” or tax withholding in France. Before
January 2019, French tax residents paid income tax on their wages via self-assessment; income tax was payable
after completion and submission of the tax return and employers were not involved in this collection. Since
January 2019, the income tax is paid to the government by the payer of the income rather than by the recipient
of the income. However, this new income tax withholding did not change the obligation to fill the tax return.
36As we already noted, the wealth tax was reformed a number of times during our period of interest – reforms
that we exploit in our empirical analysis. Some of these reforms directly modify the reporting obligations.
37As well as her shares in companies or organizations (established in France or abroad) for the portion of
their value representing these real estate assets or rights.
381.4% of the households filling a wealth-tax return are not liable to the French income tax.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: characteristics of the households (2016)
Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 Frac. > 0
Taxable income 25,544 38,559 10,562 18,643 32,209 0.93
Number of fiscal dependents 1.8 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.28
Age (individual 1) 51 19 35.0 50.0 65.0 1.00
Donations (income tax) 70.7 15,561.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Non-political donations (income tax) 68.5 15,560.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
Political donations (income tax) 2.2 93.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0077
Reduction for donation (coluche - 75%) 7.5 44.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.044
Reduction for donation (general - 66%) 30.8 593.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.094
Observations 37,828,568
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the households declaring an income tax
return in 2016. All the variables but age (in years) and the number of fiscal dependents are in euros.
the evolution of the number of households filling their income tax and/or their wealth returns
during our period of interest.
Thanks to a unique household identifier, we follow households over time for both income
and wealth tax. Our tax return data contains information on households’ composition, de-
tailed income composition, wealth39 (if they fill a wealth-tax return), and all reductions and
rebates claimed. The data also contains output variables of the income tax computation such
as the tax due and the amounts deduced for it. In this article, we are mainly relying on the
information on income, wealth, charitable and political donations, department of residency,
number of dependents and age as well as on the panel structure of the data. Table 1 provide
summary statistics on these variables.
Regarding donations, more precisely, we have information on the total amount of donations
eligible to income and wealth tax deductions, i.e. both charitable and political donations, that
are declared by the households on their tax form(s).40
3.2 Charitable and political donations
As we highlighted above, donations can be declared either on the income tax form or on the
wealth tax form for the households liable to both income and wealth tax. However, households
cannot declare the same donation twice.
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the number of households who declare a donation during
our period of interest. We observe a large increase in the number of households declaring
a donation on their wealth-tax form (henceforward the wealth-tax donors, dashed red line)
between 2008 and 200941, a drop in 2010, and then a continuous increase until 2016. The drop
39Detailed wealth composition is available for the households liable to the wealth tax with a wealth above
e2, 507, 000. Indeed, those with a wealth tax below e2, 507, 000 did not have to fill in a detailed wealth tax
returns up to 2018.
40We do not observe in the data the detailed composition of the giving made by households.
41In 2006, this number is equal to 0 given the wealth tax deduction was introduced in 2007.
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Notes: The Figure plots the evolution of the number of households who declare a donation on their income and wealth
tax forms per year. The time period covered is 2006-2019. The number of income-tax donors is reported on the left
y-axis (blue line with dots) and the number of wealth-tax donors on the right y-axis (dashed red line with triangle).
in 2010 is most probably be due to the 2011 wealth-tax reform that increased the amount of
net property assets above which individuals are liable for the wealth tax from e0.8 to e1.3
million (thus decreasing the number of liable households).42 Similarly, the 2017 drop can
be explained by the 2018 wealth-tax reform that leads to a decrease in the number of liable
donors.
However, while we observe a drop in the absolute number of wealth-tax donors in 2017,
the share of donors among households liable to the wealth tax increases, as appears in the
online Appendix Figure C.3. It is equal to 18% in 2018, the last year for which we have data.
The picture is quite different if we consider the households who declare a donation on their
income tax form (henceforward the income-tax donors). We observe a continuous decline in
the share of donors for all three kind of donations since the mid-2010s, as illustrated in
Figure 2. In 2019, around 9% of the households declared a donation on their income-tax form
compared to more than 12% in 2014. Further, less than one percent of the households make
a donation to political parties every year.
This decrease in the share of income-tax donors did not go with a decline in the amount
of total donations, however. Figure 3 plots this amount for both the income-tax and the
42Contrarily to the 2018 reform, we cannot exploit in our empirical analysis the 2011 change given the data
on political donations is only available since 2013.
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Notes: The Figure plots the evolution of the share of the households liable to the income tax who declare a donation
on their income tax form per year. The time period covered is 2006-2019. The red line with dots plots this share for
the charitable donations, the dashed blue line with triangles for the Coluche donations, and the dash-dot green line with
squares for the political donations.
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Notes: The Figure plots the evolution of the number of households who declare a donation on their income and wealth
tax forms per year. The time period covered is 2006-2019. The number of income-tax donors is reported on the left
y-axis (blue line with dots) and the number of wealth-tax donors on the right y-axis (dashed red line with triangle).
wealth-tax donations. Income-tax donations have increased from around e1.5 billion in 2006
to more than e2.6 billion in 2019 (see online Appendix Figure C.4 for a decomposition by type
of donations). This is due to the fact that the average amount declared has increased during
the same time period, from e150 (e320 among donors) to e400 (e850 among donors) (online
Appendix Figure C.6). While donations to electoral campaigns are not reported separately
in the income tax form (they are bundled with the charitable donations), we can compute
their aggregate amount from the campaign records. Online Appendix Figure C.8 reports
these numbers. While we observe heterogeneity depending on the election considered, overall,
campaign donations only account for a very small share of total charitable giving.
Last, note that contrarily to income-tax donations, the total amount declared to the wealth
tax has decreased in recent years. This can be related to the 2018 wealth-tax reform we exploit
in the paper; we will come back to this point when discussing our identification strategy.
Incentives to report One legitimate concern regarding the data we are using in the paper
can come from the fact that, given the tax credit is non refundable, only the households who
actually pay income tax (i.e. around half of the households) have a fiscal incentive to report
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their donations given they are the only ones who can benefit from the tax rebate. However,
according to Fack and Landais (2010), given it is almost costless for a household to report
its contributions, the vast majority of contributions to charities are reported in the tax data,
even those made by nontaxable households.
Further, the focus of this article is on the households who were liable to the wealth tax
in 2016; nearly all these households are also at the top of the income distribution and so do
actually pay income tax. So, the possibility of misreporting is less of a concern for us given
our empirical setting.
3.3 Empirical challenges and identification strategy
The goal of this paper is to estimate the cross-elasticity of charitable and political giving, i.e.
the following equation:
political givingi,t = β0 + β1charitable givingi,t + X
′
i,tβ2 + ηi + γt + uit (1)
where i indexes the households and t the years. Doing so raises a number of empirical
challenges, given the endogeneity of charitable giving in political giving behaviour, and the
bias that can arise from omitted variable (e.g. the intrinsic generosity or political ideology of
the donors43) To overcome these challenge, we propose a new instrumental variable approach
based on a reform affecting the tax price of (charitable) giving.
3.3.1 The 2018 wealth tax reform and the change in the price of giving
More precisely, we use the 2018 wealth tax reform described in Section 2.2 above as an
instrumental variable. This reform transformed the existing wealth tax (ISF ) into a tax on
housing assets (IFI ). Following it, two thirds of the households liable to the wealth tax in
2016 were no longer liable in 2017, and so can no longer benefit from the 75% wealth-tax
deduction on their charitable donations. In other words, for these households, this reform was
a shock on the price of charitable giving. However, it did no directly affect political donations,
given political donations were not eligible to the wealth-tax deduction before the reform (nor
after).
We thus focus on the 356, 227 households who were liable to the wealth tax in 2016. Table
2 presents descriptive statistics for these households in 2016. On average, the households
in our sample had an annual income44 equal to e135, 227 in 2016, and a total gross wealth
of e3, 015, 480. The average amount of charitable donations declared by these households
on their income tax for is e989, compared to e775 for wealth-tax donations. 48% of the
43See for example Brown and Taylor (2019).
44We use a broad income concepts, summing up all household income components from labor and capital,
and before any deduction of the tax base (called the Revenu brut global.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Households liable to the wealth tax in 2016
Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 Frac. > 0
Nb. of fiscal shares 2.93 1.33 1.98 2.97 3.96
Age 59 12 50 58 67
Income 135,227 271,529 52,467 86,003 143,700
Total gross wealth 3,015,480 4,773,810 1,687,549 2,129,593 2,992,436
Charitable donations (income tax) 989 25421 0 0 427 0.48
Political donations (income tax) 33 447 0 0 0 0.049
Donation (wealth tax) 755 4,931 0 0 0 0.15
Observations 356,227
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis for 2016. The sample
consists of all the households liable to the wealth tax on their 2016 wealth. To the exception of the “Nb. of
fiscal shares” and the “Age” variables, all the variables are in euros.
households liable to the wealth tax in 2016 declare a charitable donation, a share much higher
than when we consider the overall population. While the share of political donors – 4.9% –
may seem small, it is similarly much higher than for the overall population (less than 1%).
Our treated group is made of the households who left the wealth tax returns following the
reform – and who can thus no longer benefit from the 75% wealth-tax deduction from 2017
onward. Our control group is composed of the households who are liable to the new wealth
tax (whose tax schedule is unchanged), and who can still benefit from the 75% wealth-tax
deduction. In Table 3, we compare the characteristics of these two groups before the reform.
The control group consists of richer households, who also declare higher givings than the
treated group on average.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Characteristics of the treated and of the control groups in
2016
Control Treatment
Mean Sd Mean Sd P-value
Number of fiscal shares 3.02 1.31 2.88 1.33 0
Age 58 11 59 12 0
Income 190,891 396,342 108,112 175,725 0
Total gross wealth 4,317,088 7,139,525 2,373,508 2,764,268 0
Charitable donations (income tax) 1514 27,667 733 24,248 0
Political donations (income tax) 61 634 20 318 0
Donation (wealth tax) 1217 6,994 527 3468 0
Number of households 117,663 238,564
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis for 2016 for the
two groups. The sample consists of all the households liable to the wealth tax on their 2016 wealth. The
control group corresponds to the households who are still liable to the wealth tax in 2017, while the households
included in the treated group are not.
More precisely, we estimate the following two equations:
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ln (1 − τ)i,t = π0 + π1Treatmenti ∗ Postt + X
′
i,tπ2 + ηi + γt + uit (2)
political givingi,t = β0 + β1
̂ln (1 − τ)i,t + X
′
i,tβ2 + ηi + γt + uit (3)
where as before i indexes the households and t the years. The time period is 2013-2019
(given we only observe political donations data since 2013). In the first stage (equation (2)),
the dependent variable, ln (1 − τ)i,t, is the marginal tax price of charitable giving. Our
explanatory variable of interest, Treatmenti ∗ Postt, is the interaction between an indicator
variable equal to one for the households liable to wealth tax in 2016 but who leave the wealth
tax in 2017, and to 0 for households liable to wealth tax in 2016 and who pay the new tax
on housing assets in 2017, and an indicator variable equal to one for the years following the
reform (2017-2019). We control for household and year fixed effects (respectively ηi and γt),
i.e. rely for identification on within-household variations.
X′i,t is a vector of household-level controls, including the number fiscal shares, the age,
10-splines in income, the average gross wealth for 2013-2016, and the average wealth-tax
donations for 2013-2016. We cluster the standard errors at the household level.
In the second stage (equation (3)), we investigate how the instrumented price of charitable
giving ( ̂ln (1 − τ)i,t) affects political giving (political givingi,t). Given political donations are
equal to zero for a number of households, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
of the dependent variable in our preferred specification.45
Our identification assumption is the following: the 2018 wealth-tax reform only affected
political donations through its effect on the marginal tax price of charitable giving. This
assumption sounds reasonable given political giving was not eligible to wealth tax deductions,
and so not directly affected by the reform.
Discussion Given that what we are ultimately willing to estimate is the relationship be-
tween charitable and political giving (as in equation (1)), one might be surprised by the fact
that in the second stage we instrument the tax price of charitable donations (ln (1 − τ)i,t)
rather than the charitable donations themselves, as in Yörük (2015). We decided to do so
for the following reason: if we were to instrument charitable donations, we would need to
assume that the tax price of giving is uncorrelated with the unobservable covariates which
might affect political giving. While this assumption sounds reasonable in the U.S. context
considered by Yörük (2015), it does not hold in the French one given political donations also
benefit from tax deductions.
The identification assumption needed here is much weaker given we only need to assume
45In the robustness section 5.1, we show that our results are robust to rather using the logarithm of the
dependent variable plus one.
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that the 2018 wealth-tax reform only affected political donations through its effect on the
marginal tax price of charitable giving. While this assumption sounds reasonable, it might
be violated if, because of the wealth-tax gains produced by the reform – i.e. of the increased
resources available for the households as a result – the households decided to give more. Note
however that such an effect would lead us to underestimate the impact of the tax reform (that
acts as a negative shock on the price of giving) and so that our estimates should be considered
as lower-bound effects.
To alleviate this concern, we compute the wealth tax gain each household got out from
the reform (both treated and control households may have enjoyed a positive income shock
thanks to the change in the taxable base, given control households no longer pay the wealth
tax on their financial assets since 2018). This allows us first to introduce this variable as
a control, and second, to reduce our sample of analysis to treated and control groups who
enjoyed a similar wealth-tax gain following the reform. The wealth-tax gain is computed as
the difference between the observed wealth tax due in 2016 and the wealth tax due in 2017.46
Figure 4 plots the distribution of the wealth tax gain due to the 2018 wealth-tax reform
both for the treated and control households. On average, households liable to wealth tax
in 2016 benefited from a e8, 803 decrease if their wealth tax (e10, 598 in the control group,
e7, 918 in the treated group). Interestingly for us, we have a lot of treated and control
households who face a similar tax gain following the reform. Hence, comparing these two sets
of households, we are able to alleviate the bias that might come from an income effect.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we report the results of our estimations. We first present the first and second
stage estimates, before discussing the heterogeneity of our effects. We then investigate whether
our effects mostly happen at the intensive or at the extensive margin.
4.1 First stage estimates
Table 4 reports the results of the first stage. Column (1) only controls for year fixed effects,
in Column (2) we add the households fixed effects, and the full set of controls in Columns
46Ideally, we would like to use the asset distribution of each household in 2016 – i.e. before the reform –
between financial and real-estate assets, so that to compute the tax gain we would have observed if the reform
had happened one year before. One may indeed be concerned by the fact that households might have partly
consumed their wealth – or increase their propensity to avoid tax – following the reform (note however that
this is very unlikely, given the reform only decreased the taxable base, with no change in the tax schedule).
The difficulty comes from the fact that the asset composition is only known for the subset of the households
who own more than e2.5 million (i.e. around 25% of the households). Households who own between e1.3 and
e2.5 millions indeed only have to report their overall wealth. Reassuringly, in the online Appendix Section
A.1, we show that for the subset of the households for which we have information on the asset distribution,
these two figures are strongly correlated.
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Notes: The Figure plots the distribution of the change in wealth tax liability at the household-level at the removal of
the wealth tax (2017 vs. 2016 wealth) for all households liable to the wealth tax on their 2016 wealth. Households still
liable to the wealth tax in 2017 are in red while the ones who are not liable anymore are in green. A negative number
means that the amount of tax due decreased following the reform.
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Table 4: First-stage estimation: The impact of the 2018 wealth-tax reform on the marginal
tax price of charitable donations
(1) (2) (3)
Treated household 0.1677∗∗∗ 0.1678∗∗∗ 0.1662∗∗∗
× Post-reform years (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Controls No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Households FE No Yes Yes
Adjusted R-sq 0.90 0.92 0.93
Observations 2,344,567 2,342,827 2,342,677
Cluster(households) 354,326 352,586 352,572
Mean of dep. var. -1.248 -1.248 -1.248
Std. dev of dep. var. 0.168 0.168 0.168
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The time period is 2013-2019. Models are estimated using an OLS
(standard errors clustered at the household level between parentheses). An observation is a household-year.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the marginal tax price of charitable donations. The vector of
controls includes the number fiscal shares, the age, 10-splines in income, the average gross wealth for 2013-
2016, and the average wealth-tax donations for 2013-2016. All specifications control for year fixed effects, and
Columns (2) and (3) also include household fixed effects.
(3). We show that the tax reform led to an increase in the marginal price of charitable giving
for the treated group by around 16.6%. The magnitude of the effect nearly does not change
depending on the specifications. Further, note that the R-squares are always above 0.9.
Before turning to the second stage, we report the reduced-form estimations in Table 5.
The dependent variable is the (inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) of the total amount of
political donations made by household i in year t. As before, we include year fixed effects in
Column (1), add the household fixed effects in Column (2) and finally the full set of controls
in Column (3). We obtain a 4.2 to 4.7% increase in political donations for the treated group
compared to the control group following the reform. This impact is statistically significant at
the one percent level.
These reduced-form estimates point toward a substitution effect between charitable and
political giving.
4.2 Second stage
Table 6 presents the results of the second stage estimates. In the first three columns, for the
sake of comparison, we report the OLS estimates; the second-stage coefficients are presented
in Columns (4) to (6). We find that a one-percent increase in the price of charitable giving
leads to a 23.4 to 25.5% increase in political donations; these estimates are statistically sig-
nificant at the one-percent level. In other words, political and charitable donations seem to
be substitute. This result is consistent with Petrova et al. (2020) who deduce substituability
from the fact that households react differently to natural disasters and to political ads in their
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Table 5: Reduced-form estimation: The impact of the 2018 wealth-tax reform on political
donations
(1) (2) (3)
Treated household 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗
× Post-reform years (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033)
Controls No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Households FE No Yes Yes
Within R-sq 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 2,344,567 2,342,827 2,342,677
Cluster(households) 354,326 352,586 352,572
Mean of dep. var. 0.262 0.262 0.262
Std. dev of dep. var. 1.241 1.241 1.241
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The time period is 2013-2019. Models are estimated using an OLS
(standard errors clustered at the household level between parentheses). An observation is a household-year.
The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total amount of political donations.
The vector of controls includes the number fiscal shares, the age, 10-splines in income, the average gross wealth
for 2013-2016, and the average wealth-tax donations for 2013-2016. All specifications control for year fixed
effects, and Columns (2) and (3) also include household fixed effects.
giving behavior.47
4.3 Taking into account the potential income effect
As we have highlighted above, our estimates might be biased if the positive “income effect”
due to the wealth-tax reform led to an increase in political donations, i.e. if, due to the
fact that thanks to the reform households have more cash at their disposal, they decide to
contribute more.
To alleviate this concern, we first control for the wealth-tax gains. As appears clearly in
Column (6) of Table 6, doing so only very slightly decreases our estimated cross-price elasticity
(from 25.4 to 23.9%).
Second, we reduce our sample of analysis to “similar” treated and control households with
respect to the tax gain they got out from the reform. Despite the lower number of observations
(283, 379 households included compared to 352, 586 until now), doing so yields similar insights,
with an estimated coefficient slightly below our main result (19.8%), as appears in the online
Appendix Table E.3.
4.4 Heterogeneity of the effects
Until now, we have shown that there is substituability between charitable and political dona-
tions, with a 10 to 14% cross elasticity. In this section, we consider a number of dimensions
47However, our findings contradict Yörük (2015) who documents complementarity between charitable and
political giving. We will come back to this point in the discussion section 5.2 below.
20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3881112
Table 6: Second-stage estimation: The impact of the instrumented price of charitable dona-
tions on political donations
Dependent variable ihs political donations
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(1-τ i, t) 0.009 0.017** 0.034*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.239***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Wealth tax gain No No Yes No No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Households FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2.34e+06 2.34e+06 2.26e+06 2.34e+06 2.34e+06 2.26e+06
Cluster(households) 352,586 352,572 352,540 352,586 352,572 352,540
Mean of dep. var. 0.262 0.262 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.261
Std. dev of dep. var. 1.241 1.241 1.239 1.241 1.241 1.239
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The time period is 2013-2019. Models are estimated using an OLS
(standard errors clustered at the household level between parentheses). An observation is an household-year.
The vector of controls includes the number fiscal shares, the age, 10-splines in income, the average gross wealth
for 2013-2016, and the average wealth-tax donations for 2013-2016. All specifications control for year and
households fixed effects.
of heterogeneity that we present in turn. For each dimension, we report the point estimates
corresponding to our most demanding specification (with year and household fixed effects, as
well as the full set of controls, as in Column (4) of Table 6).
First, we investigate whether the magnitude of the results varies depending on the wealth
of the households. To do so, we split our sample of households into five quintiles depending on
their 2016 wealth. Figure 5a reports the results: the magnitude of the effect is higher for the
households in the upper wealth quintile compared to the households in the first four quintiles
for which it is relatively similar. The fact that the effect is stronger for the households whose
wealth was higher before the reform is not surprising given that, for a given donation, those
households were more likely to benefit from the wealth-tax deduction (given that to benefit
from the tax deduction, the latter needs to be lower than the wealth-tax due). Consistently
with this finding, we show in Figure 5b that the magnitude of the effect is much larger for the
households who benefited from a wealth-tax deductions in 2016 than for those who did not.
Next, in Figure 5c, we perform the estimation separately depending on the 2016 income.
Just as for wealth, we separate the households into five income quintiles. We find that the
magnitude of the effect is statistically significantly higher for the households in the fifth income
quintile.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity of the effects
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Notes: The Figure reports the coefficient and 95% confidence interval we obtain when estimating equation (3)
with year and household fixed effects as well as the full set of controls (specification similar to the one reported
in Column (4) of Table 6). Panel (a) shows the estimation of this coefficient separately for the households in
our sample depending of their quintile of wealth in 2016. In Panel (b), we perform the estimation separately
depending on whether the households benefited from a wealth-tax deduction for charitable givings in 2016.
Finally, in Panel (c), we estimate the effect separately depending on the 2016 income.
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4.5 Disentangling between the extensive and the intensive margin
Heretofore, we have considered the overall relationship between political giving and the
marginal price of charitable donations. Our effect may happen at the extensive and/or at
the intensive margin. We consider these two margins separately in this section.
The probability of giving First, we investigate whether a change in the marginal price
of charitable donations affects the probability of making a political donations. To do so,
we estimate a model similar to the one presented in equation (3), but where the dependent
variable political givingi,t is now a binary variable equal to one if households i made a political
donation in year t and to zero otherwise.
We use a linear probability model. Table D.1 reports the results of the second stage
estimates. In the first three columns, we report the OLS estimates; the second-stage coeffi-
cients are presented in Columns (4) to (6). We find that a one-percent increase in the price
of charitable giving leads to a 3.3 to 3.7% increase in the probability to make a political
donation; these estimates are statistically significant at the one-percent level. These results
are also consistent with some substituability happening at the extensive margin of the giving
behaviour.
5 Discussion and Robustness checks
5.1 Robustness check
We perform several robustness checks. This section briefly describes them; the detailed results
for these tests are available in the online Appendix Section E.
First-euro price Until now, we have considered the marginal tax price of donations. We
show that our results are robust to rather using the first-euro price.48 Table E.1 shows the
regression results using the first-euro price instead of the marginal price. The estimated
coefficients are qualitatively similar although of a lower magnitude (12.9% instead of 25.5%).
Logarithm Given political donations are equal to zero for a number of households, we
use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the dependent variable in our preferred
specification. In the online Appendix Table E.2, we show that our results are robust to rather
using the logarithm of the donations plus 1.
48Bakija and Heim (2011) use the first-dollar price as an instrument for the actual price of a donation; see
also Fack and Landais (2010)
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Sample Finally, we show that our results are robust to a number of sample changes. First,
we show that they do not vary if we consider a balanced panel, i.e. only include the households
that we observe for each year during our entire time period (online Appendix Table E.4).
Second, we show that our results are robust to dropping 2017; 2017 was indeed an electoral
year in France (with both the Presidential and the legislative elections), and so might be
specific in terms of political donations (online Appendix Table E.5). Further, one might be
worried by the fact that 2017 was also the year of the announcement of the wealth-tax reform
(in December 2017). Third, we show that our findings do not vary if we drop the year 2016
and rather use 2015 as a reference point (online Appendix Table E.6). Candidates raise fund
a number of months in advance of the election, and we observe a large increase in political
donations in 2016 for top-income earners (Cagé, 2018).
5.2 Politically motivated donations to charities
In this article, we have shown evidence of substituability between charitable and political
donations: when there is an increase in the tax price of charitable giving – i.e. in the tax
incentives faced by the households to make charitable donations – we observe an increase
in political donations. One possible interpretation for this substituability between charitable
and political giving is the fact that charitable donations may be at least partially driven by
political motivations (see e.g. Bertrand et al., 2020a).
What is the purpose of the charitable organizations, and how much do they
receive? In France, as we have highlighted in the background section 2.1.2, only the non-
profit organizations recognized as “being of public utility”(the so-called FRUPs) and the
non-profit research, higher education or artistic institutions of general interest can benefit
from the wealth-tax deductions. This category includes politically-involved think-tanks such
as the “Fondation Jean Jaurès” on the left and the “Fondation pour la recherche sur les
administrations et les politiques publiques” (iFRAP) on the right, i.e. nonprofit organizations
whose purpose is clearly at least partly political.
We have collected the list of the FRUPs in France during our period of interest. For
each of these FRUPs, we have their name as well as their purpose (e.g. for the iFRAP:
“the purpose of the iFRAP Foundation is to carry out scientific studies and research on
the effectiveness of public policies, particularly those aimed at achieving full employment and
economic development, to make the results of these studies known to public opinion, to propose
measures for improvement and to carry out all actions with a view to the implementation of
the proposed measures by the Government and Parliament”49). Relying on natural language
49“La Fondation iFRAP a pour but d’effectuer des études et des recherches scientifiques sur l’efficacité des
politiques publiques, notamment celles visant la recherche du plein emploi et le développement économique, de
faire connâıtre le fruit de ces études à l’opinion publique, de proposer des mesures d’amélioration et de mener
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processing methods, we recover the broad category of each of the FRUPs, e.g. sports, culture,
politics, etc. The precise methodology is described in the online appendix.
Next, for all the FRUPs for which this information is available50, we rely on their finan-
cial accounts to study the evolution of the donations they receive. For now, we have this
information for 38 different FRUPs, including the donations received, as well as the operating
expenses and revenues.51 Online Appendix Figure C.9 plots the evolution of the donations
received by these FRUPs. While for now we only have collected data for around 5% of the
FRUPs, the donations they receive amount to nearly e100 millions, i.e. a very large share of
the total donations made in France.
Political considerations driving donations to non-political charities Finally, note
that even donations to non-political charities can be driven by political considerations.52
E.g. if donations are used by large donors as a way to substitute for the State, for instance
if one believes that successful entrepreneurs are more efficient than the State at allocating
resources for public goods such as health or education. In a country like France as of today
– even if philanthropy is much less developed than in the U.S. – the main contemporary
art collections are exposed in museums owned by billionaires such a François Pinault (who
opened in 2021 a private museum in a former 18th-century grain exchange near Les Halles
in central Paris53) or Bernard Arnault (who opened the Louis Vuitton Foundation in 2017).
While Arnault benefited from very large tax deductions for the funding of his foundation,
these museums enter as of today in direct competition with public institutions, which, some
argue, are weakened by this competition. As highlighted for example in the “Art Newspaper”,
the rise of these private museums partly happened “to the detriment of [public] museums such
as the Grand Palais, Orsay, the Louvre and Pompidou”.54 The newspaper compared the cost
of the Chtchoukine exposition in the Vuitton Foudation in 2017 – e13 millions – with the
average cost of an important exposition in a public museum – e2.5 million.
Further, these foundations can be used by the donors as a way to promote their com-
panies. Bernard Arnault’s museum, the Louis Vuitton Foundation, is named after the bil-
lionaire’s main brand; as highlighted by the “Cour des Comptes” (Court of Accounts, i.e.
the government institution that performs financial audit55), this museum “constitutes a case,
toutes les actions en vue de la mise en œuvre par le Gouvernement et le Parlement des mesures proposées.”
50When the information is available, it is published on the website of the “Journal Officiel” from which we
scrapped all the accounts.
51The panel of FRUPs is unbalanced given some of them entered or exited during our time period. We are
still in the process of collecting these, hence the relatively low number of FRUPs included for now.
52Using French data on public subsidies to nonprofit, Urvoy (2020) has shown that politicians partly allocate
governmental transfers to nonprofit organizations to improve their electoral prospects.
53The Bourse de Commerce-Pinault Collection is a 10,500 square meter museum. Pinault – whose wealth is
estimated to $53.6 billion –’s collection contains around 10,000 works by nearly 400 artists.
54https://www.artnewspaper.fr/feature/public-prive-de-la-concurrence-a-l-ecosysteme
55Statutory audit on the executive branch of power.
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exceptional in its scope, of using the possibilities offered by the tax legislation in terms of
patronage in order to develop an ambitious cultural project while ensuring the promotion of
the main brand of a group, in a logic of corporate communication that articulates contem-
porary art, fashion and luxury.”56 Similarly, the President of the Centre Georges-Pompidou
museum, Serge Lasvignes, said in 2017 about the Pinault foundation: “it is about showing
contemporary art from the collection of François Pinault. Some will say that there will be an
echo between his way of exhibiting and his commercial activities”57 (on the disproportionate
power of François Pinault on the art market and the benefits he can get from it through
the auction house Christie’s he owns see Vivant, 2009). An increasing number of observers
similarly question the growing funding of higher education by philanthropy in France (see e.g.
Chambard, 2020).58
Furthermore, charitable donations can be a way for a large donors to open a few doors.
E.g. for a donor, sitting on the board of directors of a foundation and/or participating in the
various events organized by this foundation can allow her to expand her social capital (see
e.g. Depecker et al. (2018) and Monier (2019) for recent work, and Ostrower (1997) for a
seminal study). It can be seen as an “investment”. 59 In other words, to paraphrase McGoey
(2015) whose focus is on the Gates foundation, there is – at least when one considers large
donors (which is the case here given our identification relies on donors who wee and/or are
still eligible to the wealth tax) there is “no such thing as a free gift”. As quantified in the
economic literature by Bertrand et al. (2020a), 16.1% of total U.S. corporate charitable giving
can be interpreted as politically motivated. The evidence provided here shows that charitable
giving by individuals is similarly also partly politically motivated.60
Welfare implications and policy relevance Should we consider the fact that we find
substituability between political and charitable giving as a good news or a bad news?What
are the welfare consequences, and what should be the policy implications?
In France as well as in a number of other countries (Italy, Spain, Belgium, etc.), campaign
finance laws place limits on political donations, but no cap on charitable giving. Yet, our
findings pointing to political motivations behind charitable giving challenge such a choice.
56“Constitue un cas, exceptionnel par son ampleur, d’utilisation des possibilités offertes par la législation
fiscale en matière de mécénat afin de développer un projet culture ambitieux tout en assurant la promotion de
la marque principale d’un groupe, dans une logique de communication d’entreprise qui articule art contemporain,
mode et luxe”. Cited in Cagé (2020).
57“Il s’agit de montrer l’art contemporain à partir de la collection de François Pinault.
Certains diront qu’il y aura écho entre sa façon d’exposer et ses activités commerciales.”
(https://www.parismatch.com/Culture/Art/Le-centre-Pompidou-a-40-ans-Son-ADN-c-est-la-thematique-
1175552).
58Note however that this is not a new phenomena. See e.g. Durand (2016).
59See also Bertrand et al. (2020b) on political giving as a way for donors to invest in influence.
60See also Bertrand et al. (2018) who provide evidence that corporate foundations’ charitable grants reach
targeted non-profits just before those same non-profits engage in public commentary.
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For a politically-motivated donor who faces a cap for her political donations, giving to a
think tank can indeed be a relatively easy alternative. Further, it also questions the relevance
of having tax policies for charitable giving that are much more generous than for political
donations (which is the case in a large number of countries).
5.3 External validity
In this paper, we rely on the use of French data. While one might question the external validity
of our findings, we think on the contrary that the case of France is of particular interest for
many reasons, and can have important policy implications for other countries. First, France
has a tax credit rate that is among the highest in Western democracies. While, as highlighted
in the introduction, tax policies in many countries increasingly offer substantial incentives to
donate to charities, we think it is of particular importance to investigate the relevance of such
policies in a country where the deductions are particularly high.
Second in France, there are tax deductions not only for charitable contributions but also
for political donations, unlike in the U.S.. Yet many other countries, among which Germany,
Italy and Spain61 also have such deductions (see Cagé, 2018). Thanks to the unique data we
have for France, we can study the efficiency of these deductions, which, to the extent of our
knowledge, has never been done until now (and could not be done with U.S. data).
6 Conclusion
This paper uses a reform of the wealth tax that decreased the tax price for charitable contribu-
tions in France to evidence the substituability of these contributions with political donations.
More precisely, the reform restricted the definition of the wealth tax base to real-estate assets
excluding the financial assets which were previously included. We rely on a new panel dataset
including all the households filling their income tax and/or their wealth tax returns in France
between 2006 and 2019. We focus on the sample of households liable to the wealth tax in
2016 and use the panel dimension of the data to follow these households over time and across
taxes. We show that political and charitable giving are substitute. A one-percent increase in
the price of charitable giving leads to a 19 to 25% increase in political donations. We also
study the heterogeneity of this cross-tax price elasticity among the distribution of wealth. The
magnitude of the effect are particularly strong among the top 20% of the wealth taxpayers.
Our findings suggest that philanthropy may be at least partly politically motivated. This
idea is support by foundation-level data: for all the nonprofit organizations that are recognized
as “being of public utility” and that can benefit from the wealth-tax deduction, we collect
data on the donations they receive and classify them depending on their purpose, separating
61It was also the case in Belgium between 1985 and 1993.
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in particular foundations that are politically involved from those that are not. Our findings
have important implications for the optimal regulation of tax incentives.
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